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Abstract. In this paper, we consider K ﬁnite populations of boundedly
rational agents whose preferences and information diﬀer. Each period agents
are randomly paired to play some coordination games.
We show that several “special” (ﬁxed) agents lead the coordination. In a
mistake-free environment, all connected ﬁxed agents have to coordinate on the
same strategy. In the long run, as the probability of mistakes goes to zero, all
agents coordinate on the same strategy. The long-run outcome is unique, if all
ﬁxed agents belong to the same population.
1. Introduction
Numerous studies have shown the importance of social interactions and neighborhood
eﬀects in explaining phenomenon such as levels of education, income, production,
crime, arising of gangs, ghettos and so on.1 Therefore, the incorporation of social
interactions on behavior is of primary interest. In particular, the inﬂuence that some
agents exert on others can have a profound impact on the selection of economic
outcomes.
In this paper, we consider a coordination problem among heterogeneous agents.
Our objective is to analyze the importance of information ﬂows among agents and
see whether or not heterogeneous agents are able to ﬁnd a way to coordinate and on
what outcomes. In every day life, social norms, national traditions, and focal points
ease agents’ coordination problems. For example, when facing the choice of driving
o nt h er i g h to rt h el e f ts i d eo ft h er o a d ,a na gent follows the social norm adopted in
her country. Therefore, it is natural to assume that agents can use their neighbors
and own past experience for guidance in future coordination.
We consider K ﬁnite populations of agents, each of which represents a group of
agents who share common preferences. Each period, all agents are randomly paired
to play some K × K coordination games. Each population prefers to coordinate on
its preferred strategy. By preferred strategy we mean that when two agents from the
1See e.g Becker (1991), Benabou (1993), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Jankowski
(1991), Venkatesh (1997) among many others.
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same population are matched, a unique Pareto eﬃcient outcome can be obtained if
both agents coordinate on the so-called preferred strategy. If the matching involves
two agents from diﬀerent populations and the two of them coordinate, several Pareto
eﬃcient outcomes can be reached. The information available to each agent diﬀers from
one agent to the other. In order to capture this asymmetry, we deﬁne a neighbor
as an agent from whom one can sample information about past plays, whereas a
stranger is an agent one does not have any information about. A convenient way to
represent these relationships is as follows. A directed link from agent i to agent j is
an information ﬂow from agent i to agent j, as in Bala and Goyal (1998, 2000) and
Masson (2005). It means that agent j considers agent i as a neighbor. If the link
between agent i and agent j is mutual, as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), it means
that both agents consider each other as neighbors. Note that contrarily to what is
commonly assumed in the literature on social interactions, we do not impose that
neighbors share common preferences (are from the same population).
When an agent faces a neighbor, she can access her opponent’s past plays and
payoﬀs. We assume that she samples some of her opponent’s past plays and plays
a myopic best response to this sample that she considers as her opponents’ strategy
distribution for the current period. This approach is common in the literature, see
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993, 1998) among many others. However,
the situation diﬀe r sw h e na na g e n ti sm a t c h e dw i t has t r a n g e r . I nt h a tc a s e ,t h e
agent does not have any information about her opponent. The only information
at her disposal comes from a sample of her neighbors’ past plays. In this case, we
assume that the decision rule the agent uses satisﬁes the following requirements: the
decision rule can either select a strategy present in the sample or a best response
against some subsample.2 Our motivation for this approach is intuitive: if an agent
does not know anything about her current opponent, she may believe that one of her
neighbors could have played against her current opponent in the past. Therefore,
any past experience from her neighbors could indeed carry some useful information.
Notice that any imitation rule and any belief-based rule satisfy our requirement.
T h em a i nq u e s t i o nw ea n s w e ri nt h i sp a p e ri show coordination arises among
agents with diﬀerent preferences when the game they play is what Schelling calls “a
mixture of mutual dependence and conﬂict of partnership and competition.”3 Our
model encompasses many situations. For example, consider a Battle of the Sexes
game where men and women from diﬀerent ﬁnite populations are paired to play
each period. Note that any two agents can be matched each period. A question is
2Note that the “or” is not exclusive. The strategy present in the sample can also be a best
response against some subsample.
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whether men and women coordinate on the same strategy? Another example where
agents might ﬁnd it diﬃcult to coordinate is when they are faced with the choice of a
product. In the academic world, for example, where coauthoring makes it critical to
coordinate, which of SWP4 or LaTex should be used for the ﬁrst draft of a paper. One
might prefer LaTex but accommodate SWP’s coauthors and the question is: why?
What is more important for coordination: the proportion of agents sharing similar
preferences, or the information agents can access?
Our main result shows that there exist some “special” agents leading the coordi-
nation. Similar agents and their impact on the social behavior of others have been
observed by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) in a study on crime. They
called them Fixed agents. Bala and Goyal (1998) also studied these peculiar agents,
and called them the members of the royal family.
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l ts h o w st h a tconnected ﬁxed agents have to coordinate on the same
strategy choice in the short run. This prediction is independent from the decision rule
agents use when they are matched with a stranger and might lead to the existence of
segregated neighborhoods where agents from the same neighborhood play the same
strategy.5 This result implies that within the following common information struc-
tures: complete, all links are double-sided, directed star, directed wheel, and directed
chain, all agents play the same strategy in the short run.
If there is a small probability that agents can make their choices at random, we
obtain a sharp prediction as this probability goes to zero. In particular, if all agents
use the following imitation rule: imitate the strategy which gives the highest payoﬀ
in the sample, all agents coordinate on the same strategy in this noisy environment.6
Moreover, if all ﬁxed agents are from the same population (members of the same
royal family), the long-run (noisy) outcome is unique: all agents coordinate on the
preferred strategy of the royal family. Our assumption that imitation is a sensible rule
to use when access to information is limited is supported by experimental evidence
(see Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 1999) and Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution.7
Theoretical analysis and impact of imitation rules are presented by Robson and Vega-
Redondo (1996) and Josephson and Matros (2004).
The paper is organized as follows. A detailed description of the model is given in
Section 2. Short run predictions are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the
long-run outcomes and Section 5 concludes.
4Scientiﬁc WorkPlace.
5See Schelling (1971) for the ﬁrst discussions about segregated neighborhoods.
6We modify the imitation rule to take into account heterogeneity among agents. We assume that
an agent imitates a strategy which gives the highest payoﬀ to an agent from the same population.
This is always possible since an agent can imitate herself.
7See Hayek (1988).Location, Information and Coordination 4
2. The Model
The following subsections characterize the concepts of heterogenous populations, in-
formation structure, decision rules and Markov process used in the paper.
2.1. Heterogenous Populations and PayoﬀsM a t r i c e s . Suppose that there
exist K ﬁnite populations with nk ≥ 1 agents in population k,s u c ht h a tn1+...+nK =
2n,f o rk =1 ,...,K. Time is discrete, and in each period, all agents are randomly
paired to play some K ×K coordination games. Each agent from population k faces








































lh for all h,k,l =1 ,...,K, h 6= l;a n dak
kk >a k
ll for any k 6= l. The
ﬁrst condition ak
hh >a k
lh insures that agents favor coordination. The second condition
ak
kk >a k
ll stipulates that an agent from population k prefers to coordinate on strategy
k. Therefore, an agent plays diﬀerent coordination games with agents from diﬀerent
populations. In particular, each population k has a preferred strategy k that leads to
a unique Pareto Eﬃcient outcome when two agents from this population are matched.
This is the case when two men are matched in the Battle of the Sexes game. In this
situation, both men have a preferred strategy which is to “go to a soccer match”. On
the other hand, when two agents from diﬀerent populations are matched, there are
at least two Pareto Eﬃcient outcomes. This corresponds to the case where a woman
and a man are matched in the Battle of the Sexes game.
Denote a pure strategy x ∈ {1,...,K} of an agent from population k by a vector
x =( 0 ,...,0,1,0,...,0). Suppose that an agent from population k is matched with an
agent from population l. If the agent from population k plays strategy x ∈ {1,...,K}
and the agent from population l plays strategy y ∈ {1,...,K},t h e nt h et w oa g e n t s








The following example illustrates this point.Location, Information and Coordination 5
Example. Battle of the Sexes.
Suppose that there are two populations: men and women. In each period, all
agents are randomly paired to play some 2×2 coordination games. Each agent from















Let us call the ﬁrst strategy, (1,0), “go to a Soccer match,” and the second strategy,
(0,1), “go to an Opera.”
Agents can be matched in three ways: man and man, woman and woman, and















This example illustrates how the populations’ heterogeneity is introduced into
the payoﬀs matrices. We now focus on the information structure and adopt some
necessary terminology for the description of its asymmetry.Location, Information and Coordination 6
2.2. Information Structure. At time t, each agent from population i chooses a
strategy xt
i from the set X = {1,...,K} according to some behavioral rules (described
below) based on past plays’ available information. Therefore, the play at time t can
be deﬁned as xt =( xt
1,x t
2,...,xt
2n), and the history of plays up to time t can be
represented by the sequence ht =( xt−m+1,...,xt)o ft h el a s tm plays.
Deﬁne the information structure hV,Ti ,w h e r eV is the set of agents and T is
the set of information links. Our information structure is similar to the information
structure in Bala and Goyal (1998) and Masson (2005). We call agents from whom
agent q can access past plays neighbors of agent q, and any other agent a stranger
to agent q.D e n o t eb yNb(q) the set of neighbors of agent q; St(q) the set of strangers
of agent q;a n dA(q) the set of agents who can access agent q’s past plays. Note that
agents in Nb(q) do not need to share common preferences.
The dichotomy neighbor/stranger can be represented by a directed graph (the
information structure hV,Ti ) where a directed link (ﬂow of information) from agent
q to agent g, {q → g} ∈ T , means that agent g can access information about past
plays of agent q,o rq ∈ Nb(g)a n dg ∈ A(q). We assume that q ∈ Nb(q) for any q.
The following example illustrates the above deﬁnitions.
Example. Suppose that the information structure of the Battle of the Sexes
game is as in Figure 1 where agents 1 and 2 are men, and agents 3 and 4 are women.
 
1 2 3 4
Figure 1. Battle of the Sexes game. Information Structure 1.
For each agent q =1 ,2,3,4w ec a nd e ﬁne
Nb(1) = {1}, A(1) = {2}, St(1) = {2,3,4};
Nb(2) = {1,2,3}, A(2) = {3}, St(2) = {4};
Nb(3) = {2,3,4}, A(3) = {2}, St(3) = {1};
Nb(4) = {4}, A(4) = {3}, St(4) = {1,2,3}.
In the next subsection, we describe the decision rules agents are assumed to follow.Location, Information and Coordination 7
2.3. Decision Rules. It is important to note that each agent has her own prefer-
ences (belongs to a particular population) as well as her own amount of information
(from a set of neighbors). Any two agents can be paired in each round and each
agent chooses her strategy as follows. Fix integers s and m,w h e r e1≤ s ≤ m.
At time t + 1, each agent q inspects a sample (xt1,...,xts)o fs i z es taken with-
out replacement from her neighbors’ history of size m of plays up to time t,w h e r e
t1,...,ts ∈ {t − m +1 ,t− m +2 ,...,t}. We assume that samples are drawn indepen-
dently across agents and time.
If an agents is matched with one of her neighbors, she has information about
h e ro p p o n e n tp a s tp l a y sa n dp l a y st h eb e s tr e p l ya g a i n s tt h eo p p o n e n t ’ ss t r a t e g y
distribution in the sample. This approach is intuitive: agents are boundedly rational
and expect the play of the game to be “almost” stationary. See Kandori, Mailath,
and Rob (1993) and Young (1993, 1998) for discussions.
However, the situation is diﬀerent if an agent is matched with a stranger. Since
no information is available about the opponent, the agent has to select a strategy
based on the available information about her neighbors. We assume that the decision
rule the agent uses in order to select a strategy satisﬁes the following requirement:
it can either select a strategy present in the sample or a best response against some
subsample. Our motivation for this approach is as follows: if an agent does not know
anything about her current opponent, she believes that one of her neighbors could
have played her current opponent in the past. Therefore, it is plausible to believe
that she considers her neighbor’s information as valuable for her current play. Note
that any imitation rule and any belief-based rule satisfy our requirement.
2.4. Markov Process. Let the sampling process begin in period t = m+1from
some arbitrary initial sequence of m plays,h m.W ed e ﬁne a ﬁnite Markov chain (call




= H (of sequences of length m drawn
from the strategy space X), with the information structure hV,Tia n da na r b i t r a r y
initial state hm. The process B0 moves from the current state h to a successor state
h0 in each period, according to the following transition rule. For each xi ∈ X,l e t
pi(xi | h) be the conditional probability that agent i chooses xi, given that the current
state is h. We assume that pi(xi | h)i si n d e p e n d e n tf r o mt.
The perturbed version of the above process can be described as follows. In each
period, there is a small probability ε > 0 that any agent experiments by choosing a
random strategy from X instead of applying the described rule. The event that one
agent experiments is assumed to be independent from the event that another agent
experiments. The resulting perturbed process is denoted by Bε ≡ BV,T ,m,s,ε.A sw e
will see below, the resulting process Bε is ergodic, making the initial state irrelevant
in the long run.Location, Information and Coordination 8
3. Short Run
In order to characterize the short-run outcomes of the model, we ﬁrst need to adopt
some terminology.
Deﬁnition 1. The information structure hV,Tiis connected if for any two agents
q,g ∈ V there exists a sequence of agents f1,...,fk ∈ V such that {fl − fl+1} ∈ T ,
l =1 ,...,k − 1, where link − is either link →, or link ←,o rb o t h ;a n dq = f1 and
g = fk.
We assume that the information structure is connected for the remainder of the
paper. Next, we deﬁne some special agents, called ﬁxed agents, who have the ability
to inﬂuence other agents. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2. q∗ is a ﬁxed agent, if
(i) {q∗} = Nb(q∗),o r
(ii) for any g ∈ Nb(q∗), there exists a sequence of agents g1,...,gk such that
{gl → gl+1} ∈ T ,l=1 ,...,k − 1,a n dg1 = q∗ and gk = g.
Denote by F ⊆ V the set of ﬁxed agents. Fixed agents propagate information
within the information structure. For example, agents 1 and 4 are ﬁxed agents and
agents 2 and 3 are not in Figure 1. The following Lemma establishes the existence of
ﬁxed agents.
Lemma 1. Each information structure has a ﬁxed agent.
Proof. Since each information structure is ﬁnite, the claim follows immediately.
End of proof.
Some information structures can have several ﬁxed agents who might share infor-
mation.
Deﬁnition 3. Two ﬁxed agents q∗ ∈ F and g∗ ∈ F are connected, if there exists a
sequence of agents q1,...,qk such that {ql → ql+1} ∈ T ,l=1 ,...,k − 1, and q1 = q∗
and qk = g∗.
It is obvious that each agent in the sequence of agents q1,...,qk is a ﬁxed agent
too. The following example illustrates the deﬁnition.
Example. Suppose that the information structure in the Battle of the Sexes
game is as in Figure 2. Agents 2 and 3 are two connected ﬁxed agents.Location, Information and Coordination 9
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Figure 2. Battle of the Sexes game. Information Structure 2.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h e r em a ye xist many distinct groups of connected
ﬁx e da g e n t sw i t h i nt h ei n f o r m a t i o ns t r u c t u r e .T h e r ea r eﬁnitely many, 1 ≤ L<∞,
disjoint groups of connected ﬁxed agents. We denote such groups of connected ﬁxed
agents by F1,...,FL,w h e r eFi ∩ Fj = ∅,f o ra n yi 6= j,a n dF1 ∪ ... ∪ FL = F.
Given that the information structures we consider can be very diﬀerent from one
another, we cannot give a detailed description of all absorbing states and sets in
general, but we are able to identify larger sets each of which contains an absorbing
state or set. In the next section, we will show that this is nonetheless enough to
identify the stochastically stable outcomes.
3.1. General Information Structures. Whereas the previous deﬁnitions were
focused on the information structure, the following deﬁnition describes the important
states of the Markov process B0.
Deﬁnition 4. A partial convention, hy1,...,yL, is a set of states where all connected
ﬁx e da g e n t si ng r o u pFj played strategy yj for the last m periods in each state of the
set hy1,...,yL.
Note that agents from diﬀerent groups of connected ﬁxed agents could play dif-
ferent strategies in a partial convention, thus leading the non-ﬁxed agents to play
diﬀerent strategies. The following example illustrates how the strategies of non-ﬁxed
agents can vary in partial conventions.
Example. Consider the Battle of the Sexes game with the information structure
from Figure 1. We assume that m =2 ,s = 1. Suppose that agents 1 and 2 are from
the men’s population, and agents 3 and 4 are from the women’s population. Agents
are matched at random to play the 2×2 coordination games described in Section 2.1.
Note that agents 1 and 4 are ﬁxed agents, but they are not connected. In a partial
convention, each ﬁxed agent played the same strategy two times in the past. If both
ﬁxed agents coordinated on strategy S, then the following set of states is a partial
convention:
hS,S = {(S,S),(w,x),(y,z),(S,S)},
where w,x,y,z ∈ {S,O} and the ﬁrst bracket represents the strategy choices of agent
1 in the last two periods, the second bracket shows the strategy choices of agent 2 inLocation, Information and Coordination 10
the last two periods, and so on. If both ﬁxed agents coordinate on strategy O,t h e n
the following set of states is a partial convention:
hO,O = {(O,O),(w,x),(y,z),(O,O)},
where w,x,y,z ∈ {S,O}.
However, ﬁxed agents who are not connected do not need to coordinate in a partial
convention. For example, agent 1 could play strategy S in the last two periods, and
agent 4 could play strategy O in the last two periods. The following set of states is
therefore also a partial convention:
hS,O = {(S,S),(w,x),(y,z),(O,O)},
where w,x,y,z ∈ {S,O}. Analogously, if agent 1 played strategy O in the last two
periods, and agent 4 played strategy S in the last two periods, the following set of
states is also a partial convention:
hO,S = {(O,O),(w,x),(y,z),(S,S)},
where w,x,y,z ∈ {S,O}.
Note that non-ﬁxed agents 2 and 3 can switch from strategy S to strategy O
(and vice versa) in any partial convention. We will see below that partial conventions
contain either exactly one absorbing state or set of the unperturbed process B0.I n
our example, the partial convention hS,S (hO,O) contains one absorbing state where
all agents play strategy S (O). And the partial convention hS,O (hO,S)c o n t a i n so n e
absorbing set where non-ﬁx e da g e n t s2a n d3c a np l a ye i t h e rS or O.I nt h i sl a t t e r
case, the partial convention and the absorbing set do coincide.
We are now able to complete our study of the absorbing sets and states of the
process - short-run outcomes. An absorbing set of the unperturbed process B0 is a
minimal set of states such that there is zero probability for the process B0 of moving
from any state in the set to any state outside, and there is a positive probability for
the process B0 of moving from any state in the set to any other state in the set. A
singleton absorbing set is called an absorbing state.
Deﬁnition 5. A uniform convention, hx = hx,...,x, is a state where all agents
p l a yt h es a m es t r a t e g yx.
Note that there exist K uniform conventions.
Proposition 1. Each uniform convention is an absorbing state.Location, Information and Coordination 11
Proof. It is evident. End of proof.
We now state the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 2. Each partial convention contains a unique absorbing state or set.
Proof. Note that each agent in a group of connected ﬁxed agents has to coordi-
nate on the same strategy for the last m periods in any absorbing set. Any partial
convention has this property. End of proof.
We can narrow down the short-run prediction for the following particular case.
Proposition 3. If all ﬁxed agents are coordinated on the same strategy x in a par-
tial convention, then this partial convention contains the absorbing state, uniform
convention, hx.
Proof. It is evident. End of proof.
We now take a closer look at several information structures that have been of a
particular interest in the network literature.
3.2. Common Information Structures. If the information structure is such
that all agents are ﬁxed and connected, or there is just one ﬁx e da g e n t ,t h e nt h es h o r t -
run prediction is a state, uniform convention. There are several common information
structures where all agents are ﬁxed and connected. For example, (1) if all directed
edges are double-sided (the information goes in both directions), (2) if the information
structure is a directed wheel, or (3) if the information structure is complete.
Deﬁnition 6. The connected information structure hV,Tiis a directed wheel,i f
any agent q ∈ V has exactly one agent who can access agent q’s past plays, kA(q)k =1 .
Deﬁnition 7. The information structure hV,Tiis complete, if for any two agents
q,g ∈ V
{q → g},{g → q} ∈ T .
Similarly, there are several information structures with just one ﬁxed agent. For
example, (4) a directed star, or (5) a directed chain.
Deﬁnition 8. The connected information structure hV,Tiis a directed star,i f
there exists an agent q ∈ V such that every other agent g 6= q has exactly two
neighbors, Nb(g)={g,q},a n dNb(q)={q}.Location, Information and Coordination 12
Deﬁnition 9. The connected information structure hV,Tiis a directed chain,i f
there exists an agent q ∈ V such that every other agent g 6= q has exactly two
neighbors, kNb(g)k =2 ,a n dNb(q)={q}.
The following example illustrates the last deﬁnition.
Example. Suppose that the information structure is as in Figure 3. Agent 2 is
the ﬁxed agent.
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Figure 3. Battle of the Sexes game. Information Structure 3.
The following proposition gives the short-run outcomes for some common infor-
mation structures.
Proposition 4. Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds
• all edges are double-sided,
• the information structure is a directed wheel,
• the information structure is complete,
• the information structure is a directed star,
• the information structure is a directed chain.
Then the Markov process B0 converges with probability one to a uniform con-
vention.
Proof. Note that when the ﬁrst, second, or third condition holds, all agents are
connected ﬁxed agents. If the forth, or ﬁfth condition holds, there is a unique ﬁxed
agent. The statement follows from Proposition 3. End of proof.Location, Information and Coordination 13
4. Long Run
Many short-run outcomes are candidates for the long-run prediction when agents
can make mistakes. Following the literature, we describe properties of the unique
stationary distribution of the perturbed Markov process Bε. The main result of this
section is that only K states can be the long-run outcomes. These are the uniform
conventions.
We use the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 10. Stochastic Stability: A state h ∈ H is stochastically stable rela-
tive to the process Bε if limε→0 με
h > 0 where με is the unique stationary distribution
of the process Bε.
Deﬁnition 11. Resistance: For any two states h, h0 the resistance r(h,h0) is the
total number of mistakes involved in the transition from h to h0,i fh0 is a successor
of h;o t h e r w i s er(h,h0)=∞.
A directed tree is a directed graph (V,E). The vertices, V , represent all possible
absorbing sets and the edges, E, represent the transition from one absorbing set to the
other. Each edge is assigned a weight which is equal to the corresponding resistance.
The resistance of such a directed tree is equal to the sum of the resistances of its
edges.
The stochastic potential ρ of an absorbing set is the minimum resistance of the
tree rooted at this absorbing set. We will use the following well-known result.
Theorem 1. The only stochastically stable sets of the perturbed Markov process Bε
are the absorbing sets with minimum stochastic potential.
We can now describe the long-run outcomes.
Theorem 2. For any absorbing set h ∈ H diﬀerent from a uniform convention,
there exists a sample size s∗ and a uniform convention hx ∈ H, such that for any
s ≥ s∗ >m / 2 ρ(h) > ρ(hx).
Proof. First, note that all connected ﬁxed agents have to coordinate on the same
strategy in any absorbing set. Second, if all ﬁx e da g e n t sc o o r d i n a t eo nt h es a m e
strategy, the absorbing set is a uniform convention from Proposition 3. Third, it
takes at least two mistakes to leave any uniform convention. It is enough to show
now that it takes just one mistake to leave an absorbing set diﬀerent from a uniform
convention. It becomes obvious once we see how to leave such a set where all but one
(connected) ﬁxed agent(s) coordinate on one strategy.Location, Information and Coordination 14
Consider an absorbing set h ∈ H diﬀe r e n tf r o mau n i f o r mc o n v e n t i o n .I tm u s tb e
the case that at least two strategies are played by the ﬁxed agents. Find a group of
connected agents, Fi, who are playing the most popular (among ﬁxed agent) strategy,
x. Consider another set of ﬁxed agents, Fj, who are playing another strategy, y.T h e r e
is a positive probability that all connected ﬁx e da g e n t si nt h i ss e t ,Fj, are matched
with the ﬁxed agents who play strategy x. Suppose that this matching takes place for
s−1 periods. As a result, all connected ﬁxed agents in Fj have s−1m i s c o o r d i n a t e d
plays. Suppose that one of the ﬁxed agents in Fj,a g e n tq,m a k e sam i s t a k ea n d
coordinates on the strategy x. There is a positive probability that she and every
member from the set A(q)s a m p l eh e rl a s ts plays for the next s periods. Suppose
that all connected ﬁxed agents from A(q)a n da g e n tq are matched with ﬁxed agents
they consider strangers. This will lead to another absorbing set where more ﬁxed
agents play strategy x. Continuing in this way, we can see that it takes one mistake
to move from one absorbing set to the next until we reach the uniform convention
hx.H e n c e ,ρ(h) > ρ(hx). End of proof.
In a partial convention, connected ﬁxed agents from the same group coordinate
on the same strategy. So, if not all ﬁxed agents follow the same strategy and two
ﬁxed agents from diﬀerent groups who play diﬀerent strategies are matched, only one
mistake is needed to have them both coordinating on the same strategy. Therefore, a
partial convention is never as stable as a uniform convention, since in order to leave
a uniform convention, two mistakes are needed.
From Theorem 2 it follows that a uniform coordination must be reached in the
long-run. But a sharper prediction can be obtained, if we assume that agents imitate
the most successful play in their samples when they are matched with strangers. Call
this Markov process BIε.
Theorem 3. Suppose that all ﬁxed agents belong to the same population i and there
e x i s ta tl e a s tt w od i s t i n c tg r o u p so fﬁxed agents. Then there exists a sample size s∗,
such that for any s ≥ s∗, the perturbed process BIε converges with probability one
to a uniform convention hi...i.
Proof. We have to select the long-run outcome among diﬀerent uniform con-
ventions from Theorem 2. Since all ﬁxed agents are from the same population i,
they obtain the highest payoﬀ if they coordinate on the strategy i. The imitation
rule drives the selection in favor of the uniform convention hi...i. Similar results were
obtained in Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) and Josephson and Matros (2004).
Consider a uniform convention hj...j, j 6= i. It takes just two mistakes in order
to leave a uniform convention hj...j:t w om a t c h e dﬁxed agents from diﬀerent groupsLocation, Information and Coordination 15
switch from strategy j to strategy i. It is obvious that it requires more than two
mistakes to leave the uniform convention hi...i. End of proof.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Theorem 2 insures that only some
uniform conventions can be the long-run outcome. Therefore, if all ﬁxed agents share
the same preferences (from the same population i), but coordinate on strategy j 6= i
in the uniform convention hj...j, it is easy to see that only two mistakes are needed
to leave the uniform convention hj...j. More precisely, two matched ﬁxed agents from
distinct groups play strategy i by mistake and obtain the highest possible payoﬀ.
Since agents use the imitation rule when matched with strangers, any other ﬁxed
agent who can access this information will also play strategy i. Hence, the uniform
convention hi...i is the most stochastically stable.
Example. Consider the Battle of the Sexes game from the previous section where
the information structure is given by Figure 1. There are only two possible long-run
outcomes: all four players coordinate on a unique strategy, i.e. either all of them go
to a soccer match or all of them go to an opera. We have a unique long-run prediction
only if both ﬁxed agents are from the same population.
Some information structures have a unique ﬁxed agent. This ﬁxed agent’s popu-
lation determines the long-run outcomes: a uniform convention where all agents play
the ﬁxed agent’s preferred strategy.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the information structure hV,Tiis either a directed star,
or a directed chain and the unique ﬁxed agent is from population i. Then, there exists
as a m p l es i z es∗,s u c ht h a tf o ra n ys ≥ s∗, the perturbed process BIε converges with
probability one to a uniform convention hi.
Proof. Note that any directed star or/and any directed chain have just one ﬁxed
agent. The corollary now follows from Theorem 3. End of proof.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we consider a population of heterogeneous agents who are randomly
paired each period to play some coordination games. We show that the short-run
predictions (mistake-free environment) depend on the information structure: con-
nected ﬁxed agents have to coordinate on the same strategy. Whereas in the long
run, all agents coordinate on the same strategy. Moreover, the long-run prediction is
unique when all ﬁxed agents belong to the same population.
It is interesting to see that despite the divergence of preferences, agents can agree
uniformly on one particular strategy in the long run. This coordination is obtainedLocation, Information and Coordination 16
through the “ﬁxed agents” highlighted by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996)
in a study on criminal behavior.
The most important result of the paper is the fact that sharing common prefer-
ences with a majority of others does not insure a favorable outcome. What matters
most is not the number of agents in a population, but rather their “quality.” By
spreading widely their information, ﬁxed agents insure that their preferences are ob-
served, directly or indirectly, by everyone and therefore inﬂuence the plays of others.
This is the reason why an agent’s location (her population) is less important than her
information. This also explains why a minority can sometimes impose its preferences.
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